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


Directorate of Intelligence
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The Andean Nations and Mexico: Building a Framework for Regional Antidrug Cooperation

Summary

In seeking common initiatives on counternarcotics, the Andean nations—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela—and Mexico have created a patchwork of overlapping, sometimes contradictory diplomatic agreements, many of which have yet to be implemented. The six Latin American Presidents attending the upcoming antidrug summit with the United States will carefully weigh the potential domestic costs of any new regional cooperation proposals, preferring accords on noncontroversial issues such as precursor chemical controls. [REDACTED]



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A Mosaic of Agreements

Antidrug cooperation efforts among the Andean nations and Mexico operate against a backdrop of diverse multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements. The UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the European Community have taken an active role in negotiating multilateral accords on a variety of topics, including extradition and evidence-sharing. For example, the OAS has fostered judicial cooperation proposals through its Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. [REDACTED]

The Rio Group and the Andean Pact have served as forums for regional counternarcotics agreements. The Rio Group last April resolved to work towards adopting a common approach to fight drug trafficking and narcotics corruption. In May, the Pact sponsored the Caracas Declaration, which covers money laundering, arms sales, and suspect air traffic. [REDACTED]

Colombia and Peru in particular have concluded bilateral antidrug pacts with neighboring countries. Colombia has several treaties with Venezuela and Peru on joint border operations against traffickers, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Peru has accords with Bolivia and Colombia on intelligence sharing, dating from 1989. Mexico has forged several accords with Central American neighbors. [REDACTED]

Some national counternarcotics organizations also use informal arrangements to work with their counterparts elsewhere. Colombia and Bolivia open their police training courses to participants from other Andean nations. Antidrug forces in Colombia and Ecuador for several years have routinely cooperated on operations in Ecuador's northeastern border region, according the US defense attache in Quito. [REDACTED]

Often Immaterial

The Andean nations and Mexico have given little weight to this framework of agreements in coordinating their fight against drugs, for a variety of reasons. Indeed, some governments apparently lack complete records on pacts concluded by earlier administrations, [REDACTED] The signatories in many cases have been slow to formalize accords. For example, after three years of debate, Bogota has still to ratify the 1988 UN Vienna Convention on narcotics, whose provisions on extradition have been controversial in Colombia and now are at odds with the country's new constitution. Moreover, several cooperation pacts have yet to be fully implemented. An Andean regional police information center set up in 1987 seldom has been used, largely because participants are reluctant to share

sensitive data with neighboring countries. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Inefficiency and corruption appear to have hobbled other agreements. Although many Colombian traffickers operate in Bolivia, Colombia has made no extradition requests under its 1928 bilateral treaty--perhaps because it has little faith in Bolivia's notoriously slow and corruption-plagued judicial system. [REDACTED]

In addition, some accords establish overlapping mechanisms. Several nations--Bolivia and Peru, Colombia and Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela--have bilateral intelligence-sharing agreements whose provisions are duplicated in regional pacts such as the South American Agreement on Narcotics and Psychotropics, as well as in the multilateral UN Vienna Convention. [REDACTED]

Other regional integration moves may work against efforts to cooperate on counternarcotics. The Andean Pact's "open skies" civil aviation policy may facilitate cocaine shipments by loosening customs regulations. Similarly, the Pact's free trade provisions may ease the transfer of funds to launder drug money. [REDACTED]

Prospects

The six Presidents probably will view with caution any efforts to forge additional regional antidrug accords. They may be especially wary of committing scarce resources to fulfill regional obligations. President Fujimori probably will point out that fiscal restraint--key to Peru's economic reforms--sharply limits his ability to fund counternarcotics efforts. Bolivia's President Paz Zamora and Ecuador's President Borja may make similar pleas. President Gaviria almost certainly would emphasize that Colombia, having taken a lead role in the fight against drugs, has already paid a heavy price in lives as well as resources. [REDACTED]

Some other leaders may argue against a sweeping regional approach. Borja may claim, as he has before, that his country's successful eradication policy separates it from Bolivia and Peru. In turn, Paz Zamora probably would seek to play down Bolivia's trafficking problem, hoping to allay fears at home that broader interdiction efforts could increase drug-linked violence, as they have in Colombia. [REDACTED]

Sovereignty concerns could also limit the scope of agreements. For example, Venezuelan military officials have insisted on retaining control of joint antidrug operations and of intelligence gathered in their country [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Similarly, Peru and Ecuador probably would be unwilling to consider cross-border operations now, in the midst of talks on a

boundary dispute; they probably would also be leery of accords on intelligence sharing. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, some regional cooperation efforts probably would easily find common ground, particularly on noncontroversial issues. [REDACTED] attendees at recent OAS and Andean Pact talks favor forging agreements on precursor chemical controls, money-laundering legislation, and judicial reform. In addition, some of the Presidents probably would view multilateral pacts as a useful counter to domestic criticism that the United States dominates bilateral antidrug efforts. Both Mexico's President Salinas and Paz Zamora, for example, have faced sharp controversy at home over US involvement in counternarcotics operations in their respective countries. [REDACTED]

Bolivia: Antidrug Agreements

	Cooperation Agreement	Mutual Extradition	Joint Border Operations	Intelligence Sharing	Precursor Chemicals Controls	Eradication and/or Crop Substitution	Money Laundering
Colombia	● 1991	● 1928	● 1989	● 1989			● 1991
Ecuador	● 1991 ● 1991	● 1913	● 1989	● 1989 ● 1991	● 1991	● 1991	● 1991
Peru	● 1988 ● 1989 ● 1991	● 1916	● 1989	● 1989			● 1991
Venezuela	● 1989 ● 1991		● 1989	● 1989			● 1991
Mexico	● 1990						

● Multilateral or Regional

● Bilateral

Colombia: Antidrug Agreements

	Cooperation Agreement	Mutual Extradition	Joint Border Operations	Intelligence Sharing	Precursor Chemicals Controls	Eradication and/or Crop Substitution	Money Laundering
Bolivia	●1991	●1928	●1989	●1989			●1991
Ecuador	●1991 ●1991		●1989	●1989 ●1991			●1991
Peru	●1991 ●1991 ●1991	●1989	●1989 ●1989	●1989 ●1989		●1989	●1991
Venezuela	●1991 ●1978 ●1991		●1989 ●1989 ●1991 ●1990	●1989			●1991
Mexico	●1991	●1928					

●Multilateral or Regional

●Bilateral

Ecuador: Antidrug Agreements

	Cooperation/ Agreement	Mutual Extradition	Joint Border/ Operations	Intelligence/ Sharing	Precursor/ Chemicals Controls	Eradication and/or Crop Substitution	Money Laundering
Bolivia	●1991 ●1991	●1913	●1989	●1989 ●1991	●1991	●1991	●1991
Colombia	●1991 ●1991		●1989	●1989 ●1991			●1991
Peru	●1991 ●1991 ●1985		●1989 ●1991	●1989			●1991
Venezuela	●1991		●1989	●1989			●1991
Mexico	●1991						

●Multilateral or Regional

●Bilateral

Peru: Antidrug Agreements

	Cooperation Agreement	Mutual Extradition	Joint Border Operations	Intelligence Sharing	Precursor Chemicals Controls	Eradication and/or Crop Substitution	Money Laundering
Bolivia	●1991 ●1989 ●1991	●1916	●1989 ●1989	●1989 ●1989	●1989		●1991
Colombia	●1991 ●1991 ●1991	●1989	●1989 ●1989	●1989 ●1989		●1989	●1991
Ecuador	●1991 ●1991 ●1985		●1989 ●1991	●1989			●1991
Venezuela	●1991		●1989	●1989			●1991
Mexico	●1991 ●1985						

●Multilateral or Regional

●Bilateral

Venezuela: Antidrug Agreements

	Cooperation Agreement	Mutual Extradition	Joint Border Operations	Intelligence Sharing	Precursor Chemicals Controls	Eradication and/or Crop Substitution	Money Laundering
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991 • 1991 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991 • 1991 • 1978 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 • 1991 • 1989 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 • 1989 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1989 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1991
Mexico							

• Multilateral or Regional

• Bilateral

Mexico: Antidrug Agreements

	Cooperation Agreement	Mutual Extradition	Joint Border Operations	Intelligence Sharing	Precursor Chemicals Controls	Eradication and/or Crop Substitution	Money Laundering
Bolivia	●1990						
Colombia	●1991	●1928					
Ecuador	●1991						
Peru	●1991 ●1985						
Venezuela							

●Multilateral or Regional

●Bilateral